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Amidst the cheers a familiar crack, the sound of bat meeting ball, resounded 
throughout the stadium. Silence ensued as the fans held their breath in anticipation; 
suddenlv the roar of their voices resumed as the ball sailed gracefully over the wall. As 
the crowd chanted his name, the batter trotted around the bases, wondering if one day 
his legacy would join the historic players in the baseball Hall of Fame. The names of 
baseball's greats-Mickey Mantle, Babe Ruth, Hank Aaron, and Jackie Robinson to 
name a few-are known throughout the country. The mere word baseball conjures up 
patriotic sentiments, images of cheering crowds joined together, singing "Take Me Out 
to the Ball Game," and of fathers and sons playing catch. Yet the actual history of 
baseball is not mere grand slams; baseball gathered quite a few strikes against it 
throughout its days as America's pastime. Two examples of negative experiences in 
baseball are the Black Sox scandal of 1919 and the modern day steroid scandal. Neither 
of the events were isolated incidents, but instead were a significant part of baseball's 
development. While differences existed between the ways the baseball industry 
eventually addressed these two issues, a closer look reveals that during the early 
twentieth century and during the modern era, baseball's initial response toward them 
was disregard. In both instances the baseball industry's reactions were intimately linked 
with protecting the sport's national image and the management's investments within it. 
For more than a century baseball has occupied a significant place in 
American culture. According to Michael Kimmel, author of "Baseball and the 
Reconstitution of American Masculinity, 1880-1920," "Participation in sports around 
the tum of the twentieth century was seen as a patriotic duty calculated to reverse the 
slide into lethargy that came with lifestyle changes brought on by new technology."1 
Prominent individuals, including President Theodore Roosevelt, believed sports 
instilled in young men morality, spirituality, and physical fitness. Baseball was \-iewed 
as the superior athletic activity, and its benefits were spoken throughout the land; even 
preachers and parental advice manuals spoke favorably of it. According to Kimmel, 
society regarded baseball as an activity that encouraged independent thinking, but at the 
1 MichaelS. Kimmel, "Baseball and the Reconstitution of American Masculinity, 1880-1920," 
in Baseball History from Outside the Lines, cd. John Dreifort, (Lincoln, NE: University of 
N cbraska Press, 200 I), 4 7. 
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same time taught teamwork, self-discipline and obedience. However, baseball was not 
beneficial just for the players; it was also a prime recreational activity for the spectators. 
President Taft recognized in baseball a way of bringing all levels of people, from 
laborers to businessmen, into fresh air and sunshine.2 Kimmel quoted Donald Hall, 
" ... Baseball is the generations, looping back-ward forever '.vith a million apparitions of 
sticks and balls, cricket and rounders ... the profound archaic song of birth, growth, 
age, and death. This diamond encloses what we are."3 
By the 1900s baseball claimed the title of America's national pastime and was 
considered to be uniquely American.4 Because baseball was linked intimately with 
American identity, society believed in its honesty and morality. In his book Blackball, 
the Black Sox, and the Babe Robert Cottrell quoted the Chicago Tribune's writer I. B. 
Sanborn, who wrote that baseball was an honest game " ... because it cannot be fixed or 
made dishonest as long as there are honest men identified with it in any way .... "5 Most 
individuals, such as F. C. Lane, a writer for the Chicago Tn'bune during 1912, and 
Reverend George Perin did not believe throwing a baseball game was possible. Too 
many players' cooperation was required to purposefully lose, including individuals with 
high moral standards, like the pitchers. These players would not, they believed, stoop 
to that leveJ.6 Therefore, when the news of the 1919 World Series gambling scandal 
first became public, America refused to believe the rumors. 
In reality, however, gambling existed within baseball for nearly half a century 
before the Black Sox scandal. It merely was ignored and kept out of public scrutiny. 
Cottrell wrote 
Charges of corruption had afflicted organized baseball since it first 
emerged after the close of the Civil War. An 1865 contest 
between the New York Mutuals and the Brooklyn Eckfords was 
marred by the determination of three Mutual players to throw the 
game. But with a dearth of quality ballplayers, the two teams 
allowed the fixers to play again and downplayed the incident. The 
great Cincinnati Red Stockings of 1869-70 suffered one tie in the 
midst of a long winning streak, but that stalemate occurred 
because of a reputed $60,000 that had been bet by gamblers, 
including the Troy Haymakers' owner John Morrisey.7 
Formed in 1876, the charter of the National League stated that gambling was not 
allowed; yet limited punishments were handed out to the guilty parties. In fact, the 
National League's creator \'Villiam Hulbert" ... ran with a fast crowd. He piled up some 
gambling debts."8 Da,id Voigt provided other examples of gambling in early baseball. 
His article stated that in 1877 some Louisville players were expelled for selling games, 
and a brief time later an umpire was fired for dishonesty. In the second \'Vorld Series 
Rube Waddell was offered $17,000 to sit out of the games. Voigt wrote, 
2 Ibid., 47-59. 
3 Ibid., 50. 
4 Steven A. Reiss, "Professional Baseball," in Baseball HistotT, cd. John Drcifort, 34-37. 
5 Robert C. Cottrell, Blackball, the Black Sox, and the Babe (icffcrson, NC: McFarland and 
Company, 2002), 9. 
6Ibid., 6-11. 
7 Ibid., 197. 
'Ibid., I97. 
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"Coincidentally or not, he injured himself falling over a suitcase and did not appear."9 
In the early years of the twentieth century, gambling thrived at baseball parks with 
players betting on their own teams. Some historians argue that during the period of 
1916-1918, the number of fixed games rose dramatically. These years during World 
War I found the league financially downtrodden because of competition by the new 
Federal League, and players were unsure about their financial situation. Also during 
this time the United States closed the horse racetracks where gambling was popular; 
thus the gamblers found a new outlet in basebai!.IO In 1917 Boston Red Sox pitcher 
Carl Mays was charged with breach of contract. He had failed to repay a several 
hundred dollar loan that the plaintiff had given to gambler "Sport Sullivan" in Mays' 
name to cover a debt which the pitcher owed. His case, however, was dismissed on a 
technicality. Hal Chase, who was the Cincinnati Reds' first basemen during the 1916-
1918 seasons, was another significant player associated with twentieth century 
gambling. Susan Dellinger wrote about her grandmother's opinion of Chase's baseball 
skills. 
Essie (Edd Roush's wife and Dellinger's grandmotherl 
remembered how she felt about Hal Chase in the beginning. She 
had never seen a man play first base like he did. He played so far 
from the base that she held her breath each time for fear he 
wouldn't get back to tag the runner. But he was pure lightning. 
He was all over the infield, even running close to third base on 
catches behind the pitcher. His mo\rements were fluid and 
graceful, and he seemed to pick the ball out of the air as if it were a 
meaningless tap in a practice session. Essie knew her baseball, and 
this guy could play first base. II 
Essie Roush's opinion of Chase lessened, however, when she discovered he stole for 
enjovrnent and threw baseball games. In fact during the 1918 season the Reds' players 
believed Chase caused them twenty-seven losses. Finally in September 1918 Christy 
Mathewson, Chase's manager, suspended him for these dishonest actions on the field. 
Mathewson ftled a formal complaint with the President of the National League, John 
Heydler. Because of insufficient e..,ridence, however, the National Commission 
reinstated Chase with only a $200 fine. The actual reason for a lack of suspension may 
have been to avoid bad publicity for baseball. Dellinger noted that Heydler admitted 
privately that he believed Chase was guilty. "Correspondence between Herrmann and 
Heydler strongly suggested a cover-up to prevent a 'severe black eye for the game if the 
details became fully known."'12 Asinof wrote gambling was kept secret by the team 
owners. He stated 
They knew, as all baseball men carne to know. They knew, but 
pretended they didn't. Territ!ed of exposing dishonest practices in 
major-league ball games, their solution was no solution at all . 
. .. The official, if unspoken, policy was to let the rottenness grow 
rather than risk the dangers involved in exposure and cleanup. So 
all the investigations were squashed. This was business, pure and 
"Voigt, "The Chicago Black Sox and the Myth," in Baseball History, cd. John Drcifort, 102. 
1
°Cottrcll, Blackball, the Black Sox and the Babe, 198. 
11 Susan Dellinger, Red Legs and Black Sox, (Cincinnati: Emmis Books, 2006), 124-125. 
12 Ibid., 127-44. 
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simple, for all the pious phrases about the nobility of the game and 
its inspirational value for American youth. In fact, that, too, was 
part of the business.l3 
In Never }t1st a Game Robert Burk prmrided a reason for the gambling. He wrote 
The continuous squeezing of players' legitimate incomes had made 
illicit avenues of alternative pay more and more alluring. At the 
same time, ironically, the absence of certain and meaningful 
punishment encouraged players to assume that even their worst 
transgressions still would not, at bottom, cost them a baseball 
livelihood.t4 
Baseball owners did not want to tarnish their teams' names with scandal or lose key 
players; either of these actions led to diminished profits. Therefore, with no or at least 
minor consequences, players and other individuals linked to the baseball industry lacked 
little reason not to gamble. Until the 1919 World Series scandal exploded, the possible 
benefits of gambling outweighed its repercussions. 
From the beginning, the 1919 World Series shocked the baseball fans. Few 
people thought the Cincinnati Reds would reach the pennant race. Yet, the World 
Series opened in Cincinnati on October l. A nervous excitement filled the city streets 
and especially the Cincinnati fans. 
For all their enthusiasm, few could realistically anticipate a World's 
Championship. Deep down inside, they foresaw the adversary 
walking all over them. Not even Miracle ~{en could be expected 
to stop the all-powerful colossus from the West. For they were 
the Chicago \\!bite Sox, a mighty ball club with a history of 
triumphs. It was said that Chicago fans did not come to see them 
\Yrin: they came to see bow. IS 
However, this series held more unexpected events. At the outset of the pennant race, 
the Wbite Sox were fa,·ored to win tive out of eight games by many individuals, 
including Cbicago Herald and Examiner sports writer and baseball statistician Hugh 
Fullerton. According to Susan Dellinger in Red Legs and Black Sox, Fullerton is credited 
for creating the concept of "doping," or predicting the result of a game or series by 
studying the teams' past performances. Fullerton's predictions were highly respected, 
and in 1919 he was so certain the \'\'hite Sox would win that he said he would quit his 
job if he was wrong.t6 Unfortunately Fullerton made these predictions prior to learning 
about a possible series fix by the White Sox. 
Before the \'Vorld Series even began, rumors circulated that gamblers had 
penetrated the \'Vrute Sox, and some of the players were planning to throw the series. 
Many individuals suddenly s\vritched their bets to the Reds. Hugh Fullerton and retired 
11 Eliot Asinof, Eight Men Out, {New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 14. 
14Robcrt F. Burke, Never Just a Game, {Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1994), 176-77. 
In fact, some entire ball clubs practiced the " ... custom whereby a contending ball club offered 
a suit of clothes to a noncontcnding pitcher for beating another contender." Voigt, "The 
Chicago Black Sox and the Myth," in Baseball History, ed. John Drcifort, 2-3. 
15 Asinof, Eight Men,4-5. 
16Dcllingcr, Red Legs, 192. 
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player and manager Christy :'vfathewson scrutinized each play of that first game, 
believing that some White Sox's plays, particularly plays made by pitcher Eddie Cicotte, 
hinted at a fix. Wnen the game ended in a White Sox defeat, the two gentlemen were 
unable to dismiss a possible scandal; the \ltnite Sox had played the flrst game of the 
series like a defeated team.17 That night Chicago manager Kid Gleason and owner 
Charles Comiskey also did not believe the game was straight. Asinof wrote, 
"Comiskey was adamant in his belief that something terrible was going on .... " 18 
However, he allowed himself to be dissuaded and took no action. 
On October 9, 1919 after eight games, the World Series ended, crowning the 
Cincinnati Reds the pennant winners. However, the 1919 story was not over. \ltnile 
the victorious Reds celebrated, Comiskey and Gleason fumed. To Gleason, no doubt 
existed; his team had sold him out. Comiskey, however, felt trapped. If he dealt with 
the series as a fix, he would probably destroy his ball dub and million dollar 
invesrrnent; if, on the other hand, he ignored the scandal, he feared the dishonesty 
would ruin him in the end. Comiskey sought advice from his lawyer Alfred Austrian, 
and the rwo men decided that Comiskey should act upon both parts. He merely would 
"investigate" the rumors, asking for information about any dishonesty in the series. "It 
was a way of protecting himself, especially since there was no likelihood of any 
'evidence' resulting from it. In fact, Ban Johnson [American League President] and the 
National Commission could be relied on to do absolutely nothing." 19 Any proof 
Comiskey received, such as a letter from White Sox player Joe Jackson requesting a 
meeting to confess the scandal, was quietly ftled away. 
Bv November 1919 rumors of the scandal had ceased, and Comiskey 
believed he was in the clear until Hugh Fullerton began writing. Fullerton wrote 
numerous articles about the 1919 World Series, attempting to reveal the scandal to the 
public, but he was ignored and " ... crushed for his attack on baseball. The 
establishment assailed him, and his reputation was ruined. Baseball P.faga:rfne called him 
an 'erratic writer' who knew so little about baseball that he thought games could be 
tlxed!"2° Fullerton believed much of the blame for the scandal lay with the owners. 
Daniel Nathan, author of St1)·ing It's So, quoted Fullerton. 
Their [the owners] commercialism is directly responsible for the 
same spirit among the athletes and their failure to punish even the 
appearance of evil has led to the present situation, for the entire 
scandal could have been pre\·ented and the future of the game 
made safe by drastic action in the Hal Chase case.21 
As the 1920 season opened, new stories were printed about baseball 
gambling. By September 1920 the gambling problem, including the gambling involved 
with the 1919 World Series, was common knowledge. Baseball's name and image were 
in trouble. Action needed to be taken before the American people began to believe 
that gamblers ran the game. Baseball finally started to act in September when a Cook 
17 Ibid., 214. 
"Asinof, Eighl Men, 77. 
LO Ibid., 127-29. 
"'Gene Carney, "Uncovering the Fix ofthc 1919 World Series," Nine: A Journal of Baseball 
History and Culture, 13.1 (2004), 39-49. 
21 Daniel A. Nathan, Saying It's So, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), I 8. 
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County grand jury investigation into the 1919-20 rumors began.22 Charles Comiskey 
was one of the first men to appear before the jury, but his statements proved useless. 
He only said he had heard the rumors, but neither he nor Ban Johnson had pursued 
them. However, in late September 1920 the grand jury faced a surprise: Cicotte was 
ready to talk. With tears in his eyes, he confessed before the court. "I never did 
anything I regretted so much in my life ... I've played a crooked game and I have lost, 
and I am here to tell the whole truth. I've lived a thousand years in the last year.''23 
According to court officials Cicorte said, "In the first game at Cincinnati ... I wasn't 
putting anything on the ball ... In the fourth game ... I deliberately intercepted a throw 
from the outfield to the plate which might have cut off a run ... I did not try to win."24 
Joe Jackson was the next player to talk to the court and according to his testimony on 
September 28, he also confessed of his involvement. The transcriptions read: 
... Did anybody pay you any money to help throw that series in 
favor of Cincinnati? They did. How much did they pay? They 
promised me $20,000, and paid me five ... Did you make any 
intentional errors yourself that day? No, sir, not during the whole 
series.25 
Eventually Oscar Felsch and Claude Williams also provided the grand jury 
with a confession, and soon eight members of the 1919 White Sox team and 
a number of gamblers were indicted and appeared before the Cook County 
grand jury. The players were: first baseman Charles (Chick) Gandil, pitcher 
Edward Cicotte, outfielder Joseph (Shoeless Joe) Jackson, third baseman 
George (Buck) \"\'eaver, shortstop Charles (Swede) Risberg, center fielder 
Oscar (Happy) Felsch, pitcher Claude (Lefty) Williams, and utility infielder 
Frederick J\ic.Mullin.26 
The trial, however, met with difficulties from the beginning. Norman 
Rosenberg wrote in his article 
Since baseball's magnates obviously feared having their trade 
secrets-including Comiskey's scandously tight-fisted salary 
schedule--exposed in a public trial, they did not simply allow 
'blind justice' to run its course. At the outset, for example, they 
helped the players, the very same ones whose salaries Comiskey 
continually tried to shave, obtain very expensive legal talentP 
22 David Q. Voigt, The Chicago Black Sox and the Myth, in Baseball History, ed. John 
Drcifort. 99. 
23 
"Eight White Sox Players Are Indicted On Charge of Fixing 1919 World Series; Cicottc Got 
SIO,OOO and Jackson S5,000," New York Times, 29 September 1920, 1:8. 
14 Ibid., I 
25 Joe Jackson, interviewed by Hon. Charles A. McDonald, September 28, 1920, 5-12, 
www .apbncws.com. 
26 Dave Condon, The Go-Go Chicago White Sox, (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1960), 
75-7. 
27 Norman L Rosenberg, "Here Comes the Judge! The Origins of Baseball's Commissioner 
System and American Legal Culture," in Baseball Histmy, ed. John Drcifort, 114. "The White 
Sox were commonly regarded as the team with the most talent, though their salaries were often 
lower than those of mediocre and poor teams .... " Robin F. Bachin, "At the Nexus of Labor and 
Leisure: Baseball, Nativism, and the 1919 Black Sox Scandal," Journal olSocial History, 36.4 
(2003 ): 941-962. 
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Another hindrance to the case occurred when the court realized that the state attorney 
George Gorman had lost vital documents, including the four confessions gathered by 
the grand jury.28 "In their petitions fduring the triall Williams and Jackson asserted that 
they did not make any admission of 'game throwing,' as they were said to have made 
before the Grand Jury."29 Legal officials also found it difficult to discover any law the 
Black Sox had broken. Conspiracy to throw games constituted a breach of contract 
between owner and player.3° On August 2, 1921 Judge Friend stated, "The State must 
prove that it was the intent of the ballplayers and gamblers charged with conspiracy 
through the throwing of the World Series, to defraud the public and others, and not 
merely to throw ballgames!"31 The defense faced too many obstacles, and on August 3 
all individuals indicted were declared not guilty.32 
However, during the trial and investigation in 1920-21, baseball officials had 
worked to create a new position of commissioner to clean baseball's image and restore 
the public faith in the game. In 1921 Chicago federal judge Kennesaw Mountain 
Landis tilled this position. Landis' original contract gave him the power to recommend 
that action be taken if he suspected foul plav in baseball, but he did not accept these 
terms. "But I [Landisl want you to know that either I must have power to take such 
action as I wish or else you had better seek a new Commissioner. I wouldn't take this 
job for all the gold in the world unless I knew my hands were to be free."33 Thus he 
received powers to investigate and act upon any suspected practice that might be 
detrimental to baseball. Judge Landis made his first statement as baseball 
commissioner immediately after the eight players were declared not guilty. Landis, 
banned the eight players for life, stating 
Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player that throws a ball 
game, no player that entertains proposals or promises to throw a 
game, no player that sits in conference \V1th a bunch of crooked 
players and gamblers where the ways and means of throwing 
games are discussed, and does not promptly tell his club about it, 
will ever again play professional ball. 34 
W'hen Kennesaw Mountain Landis became commissioner and banned the Black Sox 
players, American society believed the new commissioner had purified baseball once 
again, and they returned in droves to watch their sport. Howe\·er, Landis merely had 
2
' Ibid, 115-16. 
"''Indicted White Sox Demand Particulars," New York Times, 15 February 1921,6:2. 
30 Norman L Rosenberg, "Here Comes the Judge!" in Baseball History, ed. John Dreifort, 115-
16. During this time Sidney Mudd, United States Congress Representative for Maryland, 
became infuriated. If there was no law against throwing games, he decided to make one. He 
stated, "Congress must make it a Federal offense to bribe ballplayers and throw ball games. 
Since professional baseball was played in leagues that cover two or more states, it was 
therefore in violation of interstate commerce." In 1921 individual states, such as Maryland, 
Ohio and Missouri drafted bills to serve this purpose. "Ohio Bill Provides Prison Term for 
Bribed Players," New York Times, 20 January 1921, 11:5. 
31 Asinof. Eight Men, 270. 
32 Ibid., 272. 
""Majors and Minors Reach Agreement," New York Times, 13 January 1921, 15:2. 
34 Norman L Rosenberg, "Here Comes the Judge!" in Baseball History, ed. John Dreifort, 112-
116. 
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painted the surface of the problem. Banning the eight players did not solve the issue. 
Wbile their dishonesty deserved reprimand, their exclusion from baseball did not 
punish the gamblers involved or the owners who had remained silent. Landis' 
scapegoats, Gandil, Cicotte,Jackson, Weaver, Risberg, Felsch, Williams, and McMullin, 
paid the price for all of baseball; some even losing their opportunity to be inducted into 
the Hall of Fame. 
To the average person, Landis' verdict meant that baseball was able to keep 
itself clean; in reality however, Landis just allowed the owners to escape a scandal and 
resume the business of their investments unscathed. Numerous other gambling charges 
arose after his 1921 ruling, and many of Landis' verdicts mirrored his first: life-time 
bans. In his first year as commissioner, Landis banished seven ballplayers in addition to 
the eight Black Sox. Nearly a dozen prominent names associated with baseball faced 
Landis for gambling-related charges throughout his two decade terrn. For example, in 
November 1943 Landis named baseball owner William Cox permanently ineligible to 
hold office or be employed in the baseball industry for betting on his own team. At 
another time fifty-three players were put on his ineligible list.35 Landis' actions 
ascertained that these incidences were brought to public attention, broadcasting his 
speedy judgments on corruption. Yet Landis' actions appeared to be more for show 
since he did not maintain fairness throughout his rulings. If his interests or those of 
baseball were at stake, justice was sacrificed. "Demonstrating the selective nature of his 
justice, several other players with 'guilty knowledge' of the plot jBlack Sox scandal] 
received no punishment at all nor did the longtime player/fixer Hal Chase."36 W'hen 
Philadelphia's Heinie Sand reported he had been offered $500 by Giants outfielder 
Jimmy O'Connell to help the Giants' pennant chances, O'Connell confessed. He also 
implicated coach Cozy Dolan and players Frisch, Youngs, and Kelly. Yet only Dolan 
and O'Connell were blacklisted. Another example showed itself in December 1926. 
Reporters quoted Landis as saying that Ty Cobb and Tris Speaker 
... had been "permitted" to resign in the face of long-standing 
game-fixing allegations dating back to the 1919 AL pennant 
race ... Publication of the charge, however, unleashed other game-
fixing claims ... against Cobb ... The revelations in rurn unraveled 
the commissioner's undercover resignation deal with Cobb and 
Speaker, who now backed out. .. On January 5, 1927, 
Landis ... concluded that the pot of money the Chicagoans had 
collected for their Detroit adversaries had been a retroactive 
"reward" for beating Boston rather than a bribe soliciting the 
Tigers to lay down.37 
Cobb and Speaker were both reinstated with their teams. Finally in 1927 the magnates, 
impatient with both the reoccurrence of game-fixing and Landis' confusing and 
random responses, drafted their own penalties. "The codification of formal rules and 
35 
.. Kenesaw Mountain Landis," http://www.baseballlibrary.com/bascballlibrary/ 
ballplayers/L/Landis_ Kenesaw ~Mountain.stm, (accessed 25 April2006). 
'"Robert F. Burke, ll-fuch More than a Game, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 200 I), 14. 
31 lbid., 15-16. 
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punishments on baseball game-f1Xing, bribery, and betting represented the forced 
'Withdrawal of Landis from his initial celebrated role as baseball's public policeman."38 
Even with the end of Landis' era and the implementation of new guidelines, 
baseball failed to deal with many of its problems in a timely and honest manner. In fact 
baseball's focus on its business rather than its ethical behavior during the early 
twentieth century repeated itself during the end of the twentieth century. The Juiced 
Era, as many sports writers named the ten years between 1994 and 2004, began after 
the baseball strike. It received its name because of the wide-spread use of drugs, 
particularly steroids, within baseball. Like the gambling problem, for nearly two 
decades many people did not believe steroids were a concern in baseball. Not only 
would drug use make the sport dishonest, especially since Congress outlawed steroids 
in 1990, but to baseball steroids were not an issue; thus they did not test for them. Big 
muscles were seen as a hindrance to barters, making them slower at s\vinging the bat. 
According to this view, players lacked a reason to employ steroids in their fitness 
regiment. In fact in the 1960s and 1970s baseball clubs discouraged weightlifting by 
threatening to fine players who lifted.39 However, America's pastime was once again 
blackened when wide-spread steroid use was revealed. 
Like the gambling problem, baseball's drug issue was not a simple isolated 
incident. The baseball players living in the Juiced Era were surrounded by drugs just as 
the early twentieth century players lived amongst gambling. Burke wrote in his book 
A1uch 1\tlore than a Game 
By the late 1970s, besides baseball's traditional problem of 
alcoholism, the use of prescription and performance-enhancing 
drugs, from amphetamines to steroids, and the abuse of so-called 
recreational drugs, especially cocaine had risen sharply. 40 
To Jerry Goldman, the Oakland A's team physician during the late 1980s, it was only a 
matter of time before steroids entered baseball. Goldman believed the weightlifting 
\vay of life the team had implemented would lead to a disastrous outcome. With the 
other major league teams tollowing Oakland's example and embracing weightlifcing, 
Goldman worried the players eventually would realize supplements existed that would 
increase their strength training; not all of these substances were lega1.41 
To add to the temptation of drug use, a variety of new supplements were 
made available after October 1994. With the World Series cancelled, President Clinton 
signed into law the Dietary Supplements Health and Education Act, known as 
OSHEA, which shifted the burden of proof of a product's safety from the producer to 
the Food and Drug Administration. The FDA was already an overburdened agency 
and was unable to keep pace with the numerous dietary supplements issued. lbe result 
was a billion dollar supplement indusm· that developed many muscle building products. 
Naturally these products were popular with professional athletes.42 One example of 
this type of product was creatine. While ball clubs once discouraged their players from 
gaining more muscle for fear it would slow their swing, the discovery of creatine, a 
lS Ibid., 17. 
39 Howard Bryant, Juicing the Game, (London: Viking Penguin Publishers, 2005), 90-1. 
40 Robert F. Burke, Much More 1han a Game, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001), 213. 
41 Bryant, Juicing the Game, 102-03. 
42 Ibid., 48. 
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supplement that aided in grurung muscle and strength without some of the bulk, 
changed this practice. Creatine meant the players could lift weights and still maintain 
bat speed. Howard Bryant, author of Juicing the Game, is a senior sportsv:riter for the 
Boston Herald. In 2002 his first book won the Casey Award for the Best Baseball Book 
and was a finalist for the Se)mour Medal by the Society for American Baseball 
Research. In his recent book Bryant stated, "By the mid-1990s, creatine was as 
ubiquitous in major league clubhouses as tobacco. Several teams, including the 
Oakland A's and St. Louis Cardinals, purchased creatine for their players."43 In fact 
prominent players like Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa employed creatine as a part of 
their exercise regiment. 
Baseball enthusiasm had waned since the 1994 strike, but in the summer of 
1998, just like in Babe Ruth's era of the 1920s, baseball was rescued once again by a 
power hitter. In fact it was two power hitters that drew the crowd's enthusiasm that 
season: Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa. As Conseco suggested in his book juiced, the 
homerun race between the two players was just what baseball needed. "The McGwire-
Sosa contest was great for ratings, great for attendance, and great for the viability of the 
game. That summer was everything the owners were hoping for."44 It proved to be 
such a good experience for baseball that when Associated Press reporter Steve \Vilstein 
srumbled upon androstenedione ("Andro') in McG\vire's locker, Bud Selig, baseball 
commissioner, panicked. Androstendedione is a testosterone-producing pill intended 
to raise levels of the male hormone, which builds lean muscle mass and promotes 
recovery from injuries. McGwire admitted using "Andro" and creatine. :\kGv.rire told 
the press, "Everything I've done is narural... Everybody that I know in the game of 
baseball uses the same sruff I use."45 Selig feared his perfect season was ending, and he 
told the press he had no knowledge of the supplement use, although McGwire spoke 
about it as if it were common knowledge. Merle Baker III, a Red Sox strength coach in 
1998, viewed the McGwire story as a warning sign upon which baseball should have 
acted; however they ignored it.46 Instead the Players Association was quick to remind 
the media that neither supplement was illegal, and during the time baseball had no rules 
in regard to supplement or even anabolic steroid use, although both the NFL and the 
Olympics had illegalized "Andro." Doctors believed it could be dangerous.47 
According to Bryant, Selig wanted the 1998 season's focus to remain on the homerun 
race between Sosa and McG ... >i.re, not drugs. Thus the story lasted nvo weeks was 
dropped, and the two plavers became sensations.4B Bryant asserted 
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traditions, raised new ethical questions, and required a special 
vigilance unlike anything they had faced before ... Yet baseball was 
different. It mobilized and silenced dissent almost immediately.49 
To Selig's credit, he immediately asked Rob Manfred to research the supplement and 
discovered it was a steroid. However, it was not until five years later that "Andro" was 
reclassified as a steroid, and the baseball industry banned it on April 12, 2004.50 
Baseball waited six years to ban "Andro" when it entered the spotlight, but 
steroid use within the sport existed years before 1998. In 1983 nineteen year old Jose 
Conseco turned to steroids to improve his baseball performance. During the '83 
season Conseco's batting average was .159 with three homeruns. By 1985, while using 
steroids, Conseco's average climbed to .318 with twenty-five homeruns. Three years 
later he was batting a .307 with forty-two homeruns, 124 RBis and forty stolen bases.51 
By 1990 the Oakland A's offered Jose Conseco $4.7 million per season, which, up to 
that point, was the highest contract ever given in the history of baseball. 52 In his book 
Conseco related his own steroid story in his book Juiced: 1!7ild Times, Rampant 'Roids, 
Smash Hits, and How Baseball Got Big. He wrote that at the same time that he was taking 
steroids, he was also researching and promoting them. Because Conseco was such a 
believer in the way he thought steroids aided his career, he encouraged other players to 
use them and provided them with first-hand knowledge. According to Conseco, by 
1988 Mark McGwire began discussing steroids with him. He wrote 
... soon we started using them together. I injected ~[ark in the 
bathrooms at the Coliseum more times that I can 
remember ... Nobody knew that much about steroids back then 
and nobody really knew what we were doing. As the years went 
on, more and more players started talking to me about how they 
could get bigger, faster, stronger, but at that time, as far as I know, 
Mark and I were the only ones doing steroids. 53 
In 1992 the A's traded Conseco to the Texas Rangers, and the ballplayer wrote that he 
wondered if his steroid use caused the change. He believed that by the early '90s the 
baseball teams knew all about steroids. He wrote that no one in the A's organization 
e\·er came right out and said it, but by that time there were a lot of rumors about 
Conseco using steroids. Everyone in baseball knew in 1992 that he was the godfather 
of steroids, but it did not seem to bother the Rangers. In 2004 CNN's Paul Begala 
commented on President Bush's State of the Union address. 
But when he was the owner of a baseball team, Mr. Bush did 
nothing about steroids. Although other sports were cracking 
down on steroids, Mr. Bush and his fellow baseball owners refused 
to do a thing. In fact, Mr. Bush even traded for Jose Conseco ... a 
'" Ibid., 40-41. 
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man who one sports agent told the UPI was the 'Typhoid Mary of 
steroids."'54 
Wben Conseco moved to the Rangers, he picked up three new smdents: 
Rafael Palmeiro,Juan Gonzalez, and Ivan Rodriguez. Soon he was injecting them until 
they understood how to inject themselves. Conseco also wrote he acted as teacher to 
other ballplayers, including Wilson Alvarez and Dave Martinez; according to Conseco, 
Bret Boone also used steroids, although Conseco did not teach him. In his book 
Conseco \\Tote that after using steroids in 2001, Boone's batting percentages increased 
and so did his salary. Boone went from making $3.25 million a year to $8 million. 55 
Goldman believed that pressure to succeed in the industry was the drive 
behind steroid use, and the huge pay increases, such as seen among the industry's 
power hitters, reaffirm this point. Bryant related 
For A. J. Hinch [Oakland A'sl, steroid use was a fact of his major 
league existence. The margins were so thin for players that a little 
more distance on a fly ball, a little more velocity on a fastball, or a 
bit more durability could be the difference between earning a big 
league salary worth several hundred thousand dollars a year and 
the lousy $1200 per-month pay in the minors. That made steroid 
use a critical issue. 56 
Instead of punishing steroid users, baseball inadvertently had developed a system that 
encouraged drug use. By rewarding the players who hit the ball further and throw 
faster with increased salaries, baseball compelled other players to use steroids in order 
gain that advantage. Results of a 2002 UJA Today poll conveyed that forty-four percent 
of players said they felt pressure to use steroids or other performance-enhancing drugs 
to keep up "\v:ith the players already taking them.SC 
The late Ken Caminiti was the first professional baseball player to openly 
confess of steroid use. In 2002 he told Sports Illustrated that he began using steroids to 
finish the season after in injury in 1996. He ended the season with nearly twice as many 
homeruns and a batting average that increased by twenty-four points; he also won the 
i\f\lP award that season. Even after his injury healed, however, Caminiti continued 
using steroids. 
He stated, "At first I felt like a cheater. But I looked around, and everybody was doing 
it."58 Caminiti and Conseco were not the only players who believed numerous 
ballplayers used steroids. According to one minor league player, Pete," ... steroid use is 
discussed so openly among players that everyone knows who's using and who's 
not ... [In 20011 Pete tested positive for steroids ... So did several other players on his 
team. Here's what happened to them: nothing."59 Joe Morgan, Hall of Fame second 
baseman and prominent broadcaster, examined the homerun numbers, belie\i.ng 
steroids were partially responsible for the dramatic increase. Between the years 1876 
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and 1994, a period of 118 years, only eighteen times did players reach fifty homeruns in 
a season. However, between the years of 1995 and 2002, a period of only eight years, 
fifty homerun seasons were reached by players eighteen more times.6° In 1996 Atlanta 
pitcher John Smaltz stated, "I hate to stereotype people because they're big and strong, 
to say the only reason they got big was through steroids. But I'm not naive, either."6t 
Some people believe baseball must be naive. For example, while baseball 
commissioner Bud Selig and other officials claimed they were unaware of the use of 
steroids among the players, many players stated the drug use was obvious. Gary 
Walker, a scientist employed with the USADA, or anti-doping agency, also believed 
differently. He was convjnced that the wide-spread drug use within baseball existed 
because baseball had refused to confront it for years," ... embracing the steroid culture 
for profit."62 Bryant believed that too much information existed about the dangers of 
steroids from the NFL, the Olympics, and research for baseball to be unaware of its 
use.63 In 2005 FBI agent Greg Stejskal told the Daily 1\ews he alerted baseball in 1994 
of steroid use within the sport. His information was based on a steroid investigation 
called Operation Equine through which significant baseball names, like Conseco and 
McGwire, surfaced. He commented on baseball's response. "Major League Baseball in 
effect, they didn't sanction it, but they certainly looked the other way."64 Baseball 
officials were not the only ones to look the other way, however. Curt Schilling spoke 
to the press who were criticizing players suspected of drug use during a March 2005 
press conference, pointing out that they hid the truth the same as everyone else. He 
said 
For seventeen years there has been this elephant in the room that 
has been danced around by the lot of you guys as well as by 
us ... The same players you guys are vilifying and crushing now are 
the same guys you taunted to the world for the last fifteen to 
twenty years, with the same suspicions that we had.65 
The Juiced Era issues, like the Black Sox scandal, have been slow in 
obtaining the necessary attention and actions to fix the drug problem within baseball. 
Commissioner Selig began a steroid-testing program in the minor leagues in 2001, and 
the results revealed that baseball was plagued \vjth a steroid epidemic. Eleven percent 
of the two thousand minor league players that took part in the program tested positive 
for steroids even with prior knowledge of the tests. However, Selig only released the 
results when Congress pressured him three years later. To Congress, it was proof that 
baseball did not intend to be honest about its steroid problem, but Bud Selig blamed it 
on the union. They told Selig that releasing the numbers would make major league 
drug policy implementation more difficult. 66 
USA Today's 2002 poll of major league players illustrated that seventy-nine 
percent of players approved steroid testing; yet it was not until nearly a decade after the 
Juiced Era began in 2003, that baseball finally tested the major league for steroids. 
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Even then the testing was for "informational basis only." Selig decided if five percent 
of the major league players tested positive for steroids, then baseball would move to a 
punitive stage in 2004. However, the consequences for testing positive were relatively 
lenient, and amphetamines, which had become widely used "\1lithin baseball, were 
omitted from the test. Despite the leniency, the results of the testing revealed that of 
1200 plavers tested, 5%-7%, were using steroids. W'hile many people thought that was a 
low number of players, Howard Bryant pointed out those percentages equal sixty to 
eighty players, which would be both entire teams of the Yankees and the i\Iets. Also to 
take into consideration was the fact that many steroids are now undetectable by urine 
tests. Selig, however, abided by his plan and confirmed that in 2004 the next step, the 
punitive stage, would be implemented once baseball agreed upon penalties. Just like in 
the Black Sox scandal, however, it took the involvement of a government authority for 
that decision to be reached; in the case of steroids that authority was Congress.67 Yet 
the severity of baseball's drug problem did not reach the public until two topics reached 
the spotlight: the release of Jose Conseco's book and the FBI raid on the Bay Area 
Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO). 
\'\nile Jose Conseco's book drew public attention to drug use in baseball, the 
issue became even more controversial during the BALCO raid and the following grand-
jury investigation. Baseball's inaction for so many years now e-xploded into a full-blown 
scandal that needed immediate attention. On September 3, 2003 the FBI raided 
BALCO, a laboratory that made supplements and was believed to be a source for the 
new steroid tetrahydrogestrinone (THG).68 Major athletes names appeared connected 
to the company, including Barry Bonds, Gary Sheffield, and Jason Giambi. According 
to grand jury testimony, on December 4, 2003 Barry Bonds testified at the hearing that 
he had used " ... a clear substance and a cream supplied by ... [BALCO] ... but he said he 
never thought they were steroids."69 To the prosecutors, the substances Bonds said he 
was using sounded like the "cream" and the "clear," two undetectable steroids 
marketed by Victor Conte, founder of BALCO; the prosecutors believed Greg 
Anderson, Bonds' personal trainer was Conte's middleman. Bonds believed the 
substances were flaxseed oil and arthritis rubbing balm. 
During the three-hour proceeding, two prosecutors presented Bonds with 
documents that allegedly detailed his use of a long list of drugs: human growth 
hormone, Depo-Testosterone ... "the cream" and "the clear," insulin and Clomid ... The 
documents, many with Bonds' name on them, are dated from 2001 through 2003. 
They include a laboratory test result that could reflect steroid use and what appeared to 
be schedules of drug use with billing information ... But Bonds said he had no 
knowledge of the doping calendars and other records that indicated he had used 
banned drugs. He said he had never paid Anderson for steroids and had never 
knowingly used them.70 
Faced with the same questions, five other players admitted to using 
performance-enhancing drugs provided by Anderson. These players were former 
Giants Armando Rios, Benito Santiago, and Bobby Estalella and New York Yankees 
Ja-~on Giambi and his brother Jeremv, all of whom had come in contact with Anderson 
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through Barry Bonds.71 Jason Giambi, 2000 American League Most Valuable Player, 
testified he had used several different steroids obtained from Greg Anderson. The 
grand jury testimony related 
Did Mr. Anderson provide you with actual injectable 
testosterone? ... Yes ... And he [Anderson] started talking about that 
it ["the cream" and "the clear'l would raise your testosterone 
levels, you know, which would basically make it a steroid ... or 
maybe he said it's an alternative of taking an injectable steroid, 
Giambi said. That might be a better way to put it."2 
In February 2006 Victor Conte, owner of BALCO, was sentenced to four 
months in federal prison and four months of home confinement. Greg Anderson, 
Bonds' trainer, was sentenced to three months in federal prison and three months of 
home confinement. Both James Valente, vice president of Burlingame-based BALCO, 
and Castro Valley track coach Remi Korchemny were sentenced to one year probation. 
All four individuals pleaded guilty of steroid distribution.73 On March 30, 2006 
Baseball commissioner Selig announced he was beginning an investigation into 
baseball's steroid involvement. He named George J. Mitchell, former Senate majority 
leader, as its lead. \'Vbile Selig believed him to be the best-qualified, many individuals 
expressed concern with this choice. "Mitchell has deep connections to baseball that 
could call into question his ability to act in a fully independent manner. Mitchell is on 
the board of the Boston Red Sox and is chairman of the Walt Disney Company, which 
owns ESPN, a broadcast partner of Major League Baseball that is televising a reality 
series starring Bonds."74 After denying the steroid problem for over a decade, was this 
appointment another way to protect baseball and its investments, a return to the cover-
ups of 1919 and unjust rulings of Landis? The possibility exists, however, that Selig 
chose the best person for the investigation, someone who will act honestly and 
judiciously. After all, particularly beginning 'vith Congressional involvement, Bud 
Selig's actions in the past few years have reflected a man determined to rid baseball of 
drugs. 
Throughout 2005 Congress met with various individuals in the Major 
Leagues, including commissioner Selig and well-known players in an attempt to push 
through a strong drug policy. On March 17, 2005 Congress met with Jose Conseco, 
Sammy Sosa, Curt Schilling, Frank Thomas, Mark McGwire, and Rafael Palmeiro. At 
this time, baseball's drug policy was in its early stages, and Congress was unsatisfied 
with it. The Congressmen asked each player basically the same question, and they had 
an opportunity to respond. l\Iark McGwire's responses mirrored themselves. With 
tears in his eyes, he answered, "I'm not here to discuss the past. I'm here to be positive 
about this subject," "I have accepted, by my attorney's advice not to comment on this 
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issue," or "Not up to me to determine that.''"'S However, some of the players' 
responses illustrated their desire to rid baseball of steroids as the 2002 poll discovered. 
Mr. Lantos: Obviously, the Olympics are internationally 
recognized as it has been referred to as the gold standard. If, in 
fact, that is the gold standard, would you be in favor of applying it 
to baseball? 
Mr. Palmeiro: I would play under any type of deal that would 
clean our sport and make it level playing field for everyone ... 
Mr. Sosa: Yes, I am definitely in favor of it. .. "76 
J\fr. Lantos also asked the players if, within a reasonable period of time, baseball does 
not improve, would they be in favor of Federal legislation; all players present agreed.c7 
In September 2005 Congress met again, this time speaking primarily to Bud 
Selig and Donald Fehr, executive director for the major league baseball players 
assoc1at1on. Selig was still negotiating with the players' union at this point, and 
Congress spoke ·with finality. Selig informed the committee about the delays, almost as 
if their support and authority. "At the Major League level, my staff has 
diligently pressed the Players Association and in recent weeks has negotiated ... to 
effectuate the goals I articulated in my letter to :Vfr. Fehr. Unfortunately, the Players 
Association has yet to agree U<-ith the proposal I made to them tive months ago."78 
Selig appeared to receive his support when Senator Dorgan addressed Fehr. 
But, Mr. Fehr, you still speak as if this is negotiable. I submit that 
if you listen carefully to Senator McCain's opening statement and 
other statements from the House and the Senate, I think this is 
non-negotiable at this point. I think you waited too long. And by 
that I simply mean that we\·e gone way past the point of no 
return. It's quite clear Congress is simply going to slap on a 
routine here or an approach to testing and penalties unless the 
commissioner and you do it first ... I submit I think it's non-
negotiable at this point.79 
In November 2005 baseball agreed upon the "three strikes and your out" polin. 
Scheduled to begin in 2006, the policy stated a first positive rest for steroids would 
mean a fifty game suspension, a second positive test would mean a one hundred game 
suspension, and a third positive test would lead to a lifetime ban from basebalLS" 
Throughout its history baseball has not addressed its problems until outside 
influences placed pressure on them. For example 
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[w]hen baseball tried to retain the renewal clause in its player 
contracts against legal challenges, a federal arbitrator, Peter Seitz, 
declared Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally free agents in 
1975, thereby opening the gates of the multimillion-dollar fee-
agent era. \'Vben a Pittsburgh grand jury implicated 27 players in 
the 1985 trial of a drug trafficker, baseball fmally acknowledged 
that cocaine might be a problem. \V'hen the owners ignored 
several star players, notably the National League batting champion 
Tim Raines, early in 1987 before signing them to contracts well 
under market value, they were ruled to have conspired in collusion, 
a decision that cost the owners millions in damages.Bl 
Like these controversies, baseball gambling and drug use at first received little attention. 
The industry only addressed the two problems when the government threatened to take 
charge of the sport's management, which would diminish the sport's image and hinder 
the investment potential for baseball officials. When the Black Sox scandal became 
public knowledge, Americans were horrified. They had trusted the sport to be a 
teacher of morals to young men, but were instead faced with the spread of dishonesty. 
In modern times the sport faced another moral dilemma as many baseball heroes' 
negative influence on teen athletes was revealed. Perhaps this time, however, the 
urgency internvined in baseball's honesty, the players' health, and teenagers' lives '.vill 
ensure a legitimate end to the steroid problem. Rangers' pitcher Kenny Rogers told 
Sport.r Illustrated he has a nightmare about how it might end, giving a reason why he does 
not always throw his fastball as hard as he can. 
It is the thought of some beast pumped up on steroids whacking a 
line drive off his head. "We're the closest ones to the hitter ... ! 
don't want the ball coming back at me any faster. It's a wonder it 
hasn't happened already. \'Vben one of us is down there dead on 
the field, then something might happen. Maybe. And if it's me, 
I've already given very clear instructions to my wife: Sue one 
of... [them]. Because everybody in baseball knows what's 
going on.B2 
In the 1920s when baseball entered the era of Judge Landis, America was 
hopeful in an end to dishonesty and gambling and a restored purity to its pastime. In 
the twenty-first century as the sport entered a new era with the implementation of the 
"three strikes" drug policy and prepared to leave the Juiced Era in the past, Selig and 
officials also appeared hopeful, this time for a future drug-free baseball. However, the 
policy's effectiveness and the investigation into the BALCO accusations have not been 
evaluated. W'hile examining these issues, baseball needs to glance into its past at one of 
its other major scandals: the Black Sox. Remembering the ending of that chapter in 
baseball's history, owners and officials need to ensure that they, unlike Judge Landis, 
are addressing the entire problem and not merely sacrificing plavers for the game's 
reputation and profits. Baseball remains America's pastime. Yet, its image has been 
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tarnished; a simple coat of paint will only hide the flaws, not prevent the rust that could 
eventually erode the entire industry. 
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